Fallibilism and Progress of Science by Komendziński, Tomasz
THEORIA ET HISTORIA SCIENTIARUM V O L. 1 




Nicolaus Copernicus University 
Toruń 
Tomasz Komendzinski 
FALLIBILISM AND PROGRESS OF SCIENCE 
A good deal of contemporary philosophy of science is historical in character; 
it has, nevertheless, an epistemological side. Questions about the epistemic status of 
scientific knowledge are the key to understanding of various pictures of the history 
of science. Three epistemological positions are relevant here: dogmatism, fallibilism, 
and scepticism. Historically oriented philosophy of science looks at science primarily 
as a process (but this does not preclude but rather presupposes some conception of 
how it is structured at a time). Thinking of science as a process assumes some model 
within which the phases of the developmental process take place. Now, it is our belief 
that some epistemological (background) assumptions must be made in order to make 
sense of the normative notion of the progress of science. 
I think that controversies in the historical perspective of the philosophy of 
science are related to the line: philosophy of science — history of science — science 
and are concerned with a degree in which some conceptions of the philosophy of 
science are „forced” in to the boxes of the history of science. In the nonhistorical 
trend of the philosophy of science controversies are situated along the line: Science 
— structure of science — philosophy of science (methodology of science) and are 
concerned with a degree in which conceptions of the philosophy of science 
reconstructs some period of history of science 1 
My aim in the present paper is: 
1) to offer alternative model formulations of the future of science in the 
historical philosophy of science; 





2) to elucidate relations between fallibilism, scepticism, and dogmatism; 
3) to propose a model of the fallibilistic philosophy of science; and 
4) to elucidate possible various versions of the progress of science in the 
fallibilistic model. 
FALLIBILISM, SCEPTICISM AND DOGMATISM 
Present fallibilism reflects alternative and dichotomical nature of the 
contemporary philosophy of science. Actual — future, true — putative, statical — 
dinamic, finity — infinity, these are some alternatives in the epistemological 
characteristic of the philosophy of science in second period of the XX century. 
Fallibilism is ,,an intermediate epistemological position less optimistic than 
dogmatism, but at the sometime less pessimistic than scepticism” 2. It is a line from 
Peirce’s conception of fallibilism. What are the tenets claimed by fallibilism? What 
the tenets claimed by dogmatism? What are the tenets held by scepticism? We have 
the following picture 3: 
Susan Haack says that „Peirce holds than any of our beliefs could be mistaken, 
that dogmatism is too optimistic and scepticism too pessimistic” 4. 
The above picture suggests contradiction between the approaches of dogmatism, 
fallibilism and scepticism. I think that it is a mistaken suggestion. Althought there 
are contradictions between conceptions of science of dogmatism, fallibilism and 
scepticism they are still related to future science. Projection of that situation to actual 
science is unjustified. 
One should notice that: 
1) Dogmatism proclaims that some of our beliefs are not wrong (if related to 
actual science and future science), but some of our actual beliefs are not wrong, but 
they may be wrong (if related to future science). 
2) Fallibilism proclaims that some of our beliefs are not wrong (if related to 
actual science), but any (but not all) of our beliefs could be wrong (if related to future 
science). 
2 See Susan Haaek’s, Descartes, Peirce and the Cognitive Community, The Mo- nist, 
1982 (2), p. 171. 
3 The picture from Haaek’s Descartes..., p. 172. 
4 Ibid., p. 172. 
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3) Scepticism proclaims that some of our beliefs are wrong (if related to actual 
and future science), but any (or all) of our actual beliefs could be wrong (if related to 
future science). 
Contradictions in future science results between: 
— dogmatic conception of science, which tends toward positive knowledge, 
which is confirmed, 
— fallibilistic conception of science which tends toward positive and negative 
knowledge, which is disconfirmed, 
— sceptical conception of science, which tends toward negative knowledge. 
Here is the picture which presents situation in actual science and in future science. 
Contradictions in future science: 
— contradictions between actual true beliefs of dogmatism, which are true also 
in future science and actual beliefs of fallibilism, which may be wrong in future 
science (are potentially wrong); 
— contradictions between actual wrong beliefs of scepticism, which are wrong 
also in future science and actually wrong beliefs of fallibilism, which may be true in 
future science (are potentially true); 
— contradictions between future true beliefs of dogmatism in future science (all 
beliefs are true) and future wrong beliefs of scepticism in future science (all beliefs 
are wrong); 
— contradictions between actual wrong beliefs of dogmatism, which are 
rejected from future science and actual wrong beliefs of fallibilism, which are in 
future science as negative knowledge. 
In effect one needs to say that: 
— there are not contradictions between dogmatism, fallibilism and scepticism in 
actual science, 
— controversies between dogmatism, fallibilism and scepticism are relations 
between two periods in history of science and are stated in future science (second 
period in relation), and 
— elements differing dogmatism, fallibilism and scepticism are of conceptual 
nature: aim of science, growth of science and progress of science. 
I think that for the historical trend of the philosophy of science what is 
fundamental is not a problem of the status of actual or future science, but relation 
between first and second period in history of science — because the importance of 
concept of the growth and progress of science for considerations in historical 
philosophy of science. The crucial question is ,,How does science growth and 
progress? I think, that growth of science is the sequence of periods of the history of 




confirmed) and negative knowledge (which is disconfirmed) into account. Progress 
of science may be considered as relating to: 
— the future of science (expectation of the future states of scientific 
knowledge), 
— relation between additional periods of the growth of science taking only 
positive knowledge into account (also negative knowledge — in historical analysis 
— which was confirmed in prior considered period of the growth of science which 
is actual negative knowledge, but was positive knowledge in prior period of the 
growth of science). 
We have following relations between elements of the historical philosophy of 
science in the perspective on the future of science: 
This picture represent a model situation. Philosophy of science is here placed 
above history of science, and that suggests a separation between philosophy of 
science and history of science. Practically the history of science and the growth of 
science level is of frequent occurrence in philosophy of science and progress of 
science level. I am conscious of this mediation (history of science — growth of 
science and philosophy of science — progress of science) and model situation. 





progress of science will be understood as the growth of science, which will be enriched 
by valuation with teoretical perspective some conception of the philosophy of science. 
The concept of the future science or future state of the scientific knowledge is directly 
related to the state of knowledge, which is received as result of prevision on the basis 
of the actual science. I tm not interested in prevision of future science, but I should 
like to consider question of the growth of science and relations between periods of 
this growth. Relation between actual science and future science will be considered as 
model situation for relation between two periods cf the growth of science in general. 
Nicholas Rescher 5 considers five conceptions of the future of science „They are 
distinguished by the way in which the choices built into the following scheme are 
resolved: 
The prospect of ongoing scientific discovery is „limited/unlimited”. In the former 
case of elimitation, the limits of innovation will be eventually „finally 
attained/asymptotically approached” and these limits are due to the finitude and 
limited complexity of ,,nature/man”. Five alternative themes arise through the 
variation of the factors at issue here 6. 
These five conception of the future of science are: 
1) Model of Nature Exhaustion (Ultimate Completion), 
2) Model of Nature Saturation (Asymptotic Completion), 
3) Model of Capacity Exhaustion, 
4) Model of Capacity Saturation (Asymptotic Incapacitation), 
5) Model of Unlimited Horizons (Potentially Unending Progress). 
MODEL OF NATURE EXAUSTION 
 
5 N. Rescher, Scientific Progress, Blackwell, Oxford 1978. 6 Ibid., p. 7. 
Horizons of scientific innovation are limited through finiteness of nature, but in the 
end horizons are attained. This model is also called Ultimate Completion Model. Science 
has here a finite history, which is marked by two moments: a) start and some conditions 
and 2) ultimate point when ,,»all returns are in« because nothing of really fundamental 
importance remains to be discovered” 10. Progress of science is here considered in terms 
of discovery exhaustion. We have here a case of geographic exploration, where aims of 
                                              




science is attained when „all that was once terra incognita is charted. The stock of 
potential scientific discoveries that reveal the „secrets of nature” is like the apples on a 
tree, all of which eventually get picked off, or like a vein of ore that eventually becomes 
exhausted” 11. In Nature Exhaustion Model is considered ultimate exhaustion of the 
manifold of unrealized cognitive possibilities. Aim of science is attained, when science 
„has no future” as an innovative enterprise. 
  
One needs to remember here, that horizons of scientific innovations are limited 
through limiteness of nature, but are not attained. They are only asymptotically attained. 
In the views of these models field of potential discoveries is only partly limited and is not 
never fully and completely exhausted. 
„The total exploration of nature is achieved only gradually and „in the limit”, because 
the upper limit of potential scientific discovery in never actually reached, but only 
approached asymptotically over „the long run” of scientific progress”12. 
Science in Nature Saturation Model „has a future” because always will 
be worthwhile discoveries to be made. Appearance of news discoveries not altering 
essentially actual understanding of nature what is related to increase of precision in world 
view and making adjustments and refinements. All it turns only to marginal adjustments 
in our world-picture. „Scientific progress does not ever quite reach a situation, that is 
completed, final, and statically unchanging because the domain of potential discovery has 
been completely exhausted — rather, it moves toward this position by way asymptotic 
approximation to a finally adequate picture of the world” 13. 
MODEL OF CAPACITY EXHAUSTION (IMPASSABLE BARRIER) 
                                              
11 Ibid., p. 8. 
12 Ibid., p. 11. 






In Capacity Exhaustion Model we consider a question of completion of the progress 
of science in case when science attain critical moment of informations barrier. In views 
of Rescher, in spite of completion, field of potential discoveries consists in teoretical 
possibilities of the future science. The question of completion of scientific progress is 
risen by the limits and limitation of the possibilities in procurement of informations. 
Progress of science is impeded because we have reached informational barrier: our 
capacity for obtaing date about the world has been pushed to limit. „To be sure, the 
circumstances of the case are such, that further findings could be made if these 
information-gathering limits could be removed, but this is a visionary and unrealizable 
circumstance. The enlargement of knowledge in natural science comes to an ultimate stop 
with a limitation of nec plus ultra beyond which lies a terra incognita whose secrets our 
meager powers are too feeble to penetrate. We can push the scientific enterprise only „up 




MODEL OP CAPACITY SATURATION (ASYMPTOTIC INCAPACITATION) 
  
Like the Nature Saturation Model case of asymptotic completion, the Capacity 
Saturation Model case envisages the ultimate stabilization of our scientific knowledge. 
„But it takes the view that this is so not because the range of potential discovery is being 
exhausted, but rather because man’s ability to press into the heretofore unexplored regions 
of this range is increasingly impeded. As with the „impassable barrier” envisaged by Bury, 
there is a limit „beyond which not” — but a limit, that is actually not ever reached, but 
merely approached” 14. 
MODEL OF UNLIMITED HORIZONS 
  
In Unlimited Horizons Model are not limits of the field of scientific progress and 
limits of the expansion of knowledge imposed by the limitations of man. „There is little 
doubt, that this is the traditional view held —
                                              




or at any rate supported — by many of the greatest natural scientists from Newton 
to our own day. [...] To be sure, neither of these statements says flatly that the pool 
of unrealized discoveries is literally infinite, a thesis which — as we shall see — 
also finds its share of advocates” 153. 
FALLIBILISM, SCEPTICISM, DOGMATISM AND PROGRESS OF SCIENCE 
In the first part of my paper I was trying to show that in perspective of actual 
science have not controversy between fallibilism, scepticism and dogmatism (as 
conceptions from historical philosophy of science). Controversies that do appear 
are only related to a future science. Aim, progress and growth of science it are 
here kay-concepts. I should like to consider here general model of fallibilistic 
philosophy of science and five model conceptions of the progress of science. 
Actual science is not contradicto- nary level between fallibilism, scepticism and 
dogmatism, but is open to possibility of different interpretations from fallibilist, 
sceptical, and dogmatic points of view. Model situation in actual science is as 
follows: 
  
One needs to start from belief, which: 
— through confirmation obtains certainty what ensure unattainable of truth, 
— through refutation point to fallibility and lead to falsehood and 
— through doubt one opens the way to truth or way to falsehood. Theory 
represents here our first and elementary knowledge, which we 
hold always. On the basis of this knowledge belief is confirmed, refuted
                                              




or left as non-certain, but also non-fallible. On the basis of elementary knowledge 
may to commits followings interpretations: fallibilistic, sceptical and dogmatistic. 
On present it scheme: 
We obtain three interpretations concerning present different justification 
methods of scientific beliefs: positive (dogmatism), negative (scepticism) and 
positive and negative (fallibilism). Situation that is different than that in the actual 
science. Future science as viewed from the standpoint of the actual science shows 
that fallibilism, scepticism and dogmatism are contradictory positions in the 
philosophy of science. That may be shown on the following scheme: 
One may perhaps notice, that are contradictory related here only to a part of 
future scientific knowledge. The field representing part of knowledge on the basis 
of which we have not reached agreement whether has (will be to have) nature of 
another one mistake, knowledge, which is doomed to doubt, whether certain 
knowledge. 





science on basis relation between actual science and future science with 
place and role of general concepts in science. It is picture of that relation in 
fallibilistic philosophy of science. 
 
On basis considerations from that chapter and results of considerations related 
to future science I think that there are five models of the progress of science in 
fallibilistic conception of the philosophy of science. There are some analogies to 
models of future science. The five models are: 
1) Model of Theory Exhaustion (Ti—T2), 
2) Model of Theory Saturation (T—F), 
3) Model of Capacity Exhaustion of Fallibilism (Fj—F2), 
4) Model of Capacity Saturation of Fallibilism (F—T) and 
5) Model of Unlimited Progress. 
 
In Theory Exhaustion Model theory is characterized in terms of explanatory 




science is exhausted the need for a new theory T2 arises, which would be able to 
explain what was not explained by first theory T. These theories are in some relations 
(p.ex. corespondence) or are incomensurable. Growth of science is here described 
by explaining the force of theory, instead progress of science by dependence between 
theories following one after the another. 
MODEL OF THEORY SATURATION (T—F) 
  
In the Theory Saturation Model theory is also characterized in terms akin to 
concept of explanatory force and its exhaustion. Compared with Theory Exhaustion 
Model in Theory Saturation Model explanatory force of theory is not exhausted. 
Only asymptotic approach to exhaustion of the explanatory force of the theory. This 
process is the growth of science. In order to exhaust explanatory force of a theory it 
must be enriched by hipothesis, which creates new fallibilistic perspective. It 
moreover determines progress of science in Theory Saturation Model. 
MODEL OF THE CAPACITY EXHAUSTION OF FALLIBILISM (F—F2) 
Capacity Exhaustion of Fallibilism Model 14, is equivalent of Theory Exhaustion 
Model with distinction, that the first model is related to expansive field of scientific 
knowledge and foundation of knowledge. 
14 Capacity of fallibilism it is capacity of actual scientific knowledge (positive and 
negative) to change of the degree of confirmation. Exhaustion of the capacity determine 
impassibility move of hypothesis and change of structure of scientific knowledge (relation 
between positive scientific knowledge and negative scientific knowledge) with assumption 
agreements with set of theories from the fallibilism (from fallibilism capacity). The one 




Here not only explanatory force of a theory is exhausted, but also capacity of its 
supply. A necessity of appealing to a new theory arises, but theory is founded on 
basis new hypothesis, which are not founded on the basis of hipotetical capacity of 
fallibilism F1 and theory T1. With new theory T2 is founded new capacity making of 
hypothesis-capacity of fallibilism F2. 
Exhaustion of capacity Fallibilism F1 represent growth of science, relation 
between fallibilism capacity F1 and fallibilism capacity F2 determine progress of 
science in that model. 
MODEL OF THE CAPACITY SATURATION OF FALLIBILISM (F—T) 
Capacity Saturation of Fallibilism Model16 is equivalent of Theory Saturation 
Model with distinction that first model is related to the expansive field of scientific 
knowledge and to the foundation of knowledge. In this case not only explaining force 
of theory is saturated, but also capacity of its supply. Explaining force of theory and 
capacity making hypothesis from fallibilism capacity are not exhausted. A necessity 
of new theory appeal to fallibilism capacity from actual science.
                                              
fallibilism or change of the structure of scientific knowledge but going beyond the agreement 
and coherence conditions. Difference between addition of fallibilism capacity and addition of 
theory lies in the fact that theory contains only positive knowledge, while holistic conception 
of fallibilism contains positive knowledge and also negative. 
16 Conception of fallibilism capacity see 14. Difference between saturation of fallibilism 
capacity and saturation of theory lies in the fact that the first determine impossibility exhaustion 
of fallibilism capacity in a structure of scientific knowledge (structure of science is related to 
relation between positive knowledge and negative knowledge), while the second determine 





MODEL OF THEORY EXHAUSTION (T1_T2) 
  
  
In Unlimited Horizons of Fallibilism Model unlimited horizons have fallibilistic 
capacity of creating new theories and producting new hypothesis. In that model there 
exist a possibility of the growth of science 
(exhaustion of the explanatory force of positive scientific knowledge, which is represented 
through the theory). Addition of fallibilism capacity (new hypothesis) through change of the 
structure of scientific knowledge (ex. new theory), but not going beyond agreement and 
coherence conditions, it is a solution in case of the saturation of fallibilism capacity.
 
 
and progress of science. Revolutions of science within Unlimited Horizons of 
Fallibilism Model are rather impossible. Its are only general considerations of 
fallibilistic philosophy of science. On needs now detail analysis. 
Student of philosophy of science (in historicl philosophy of science especially) 
should have in mind, that model is only starting point of a set of views. A Model is 
allways general and „forced” from one side. From second side model is all ways 
redundant and also insufficient. 
